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Abstract
We seek to take a different approach in deriving the optimal search policy for the repeated
consumer search model found in Fishman & Rob (1995) with the main motivation of dropping
the assumption of prior knowledge of the price distribution F (p) in each period. We will do
this by incorporating the famous multi-armed bandit problem (MAB). We start by modifying
the MAB framework to fit the setting of the repeated consumer search model and formulate
the objective as a dynamic optimization problem. Then, given any sequence of exploration we
assign a value to each store in that sequence using Bellman equations. We then proceed to break
down the problem into individual optimal stopping problems for each period which incidentally
coincides with the framework of the famous secretary problem where we proceed to derive the
optimal stopping policy. We will see that implementing the optimal stopping policy in each
period solves the original dynamic optimization by ‘forward induction’ reasoning.
1 Introduction
In the repeated consumer search model (Fishman & Rob, 1995) consumers are faced with a market
selling the same product but with price dispersion. Consumers then have the objective of maximiz-
ing their own surplus by purchasing a unit of the product but at the lowest possible price, but are
faced with the additional challenge of not knowing the prices in each store. They can resolve this
lack of information by searching (exploration) which incurs a search cost c. Hence the main essence
of the consumer’s problem is to decide whether or not exploration is worthwhile. The setting is
also a dynamic one, meaning that the consumer will have to repeat this purchasing process in every
time period until the terminal period. The dynamic setting is used to portray the potential for
long-term business relationships between firms and consumers.
The model in Fishman & Rob (1995) proceeds its analysis with the assumption that consumers
know the price distribution F (p) beforehand in each period. We drop this assumption for the goal of
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deriving a search policy that captures more realism as this assumption is very hard to translate into
reality. (How does one go about knowing the price distribution in each period? Why is this? What
does this assumption represent?) Furthermore, the optimal search rule in Fishman & Rob (1995)
seems very abstract in that it only describes the behavior of consumers given different transition
probabilities rather than giving more concrete instructions to the consumer.
To derive the optimal search policy without the prior knowledge assumption, we will incorporate
the famous multi-armed bandit problem (MAB) which has found many applications even outside
economics. In McCall & McCall (1987) they also use the MAB framework for designing a model
for migration and sequential job search models, in which we aim to do something similar.
The MAB problem is used as it inherently assumes that agents have no information (though
priors are allowed) about reward distributions.1 By formulating the search model into the MAB
framework, we hope to be able to adopt and modify computational methods and results to provide
us with further insight into a consumer’s optimal search rule under relaxed assumptions and under a
more general setting. It should also be noted that this paper’s analysis is focused on the consumer,
demand-side. Further analysis on the producer side will be required in order to gain any insight or
implications this general setting may have on the market equilibrium.
2 Literature Review
This section will give a brief overview and summary of relevant literature and existing models.
2.1 The Repeated Purchase Search Model (Fishman & Rob, 1995)
Here we will introduce our starting point, the repeated purchase search model for a single good
more formally, which is a natural extension of the price dispersion model in Reinganum (1979).2
The model’s set-up starts with a large number n of identical consumers with individual demand
for the single good x = D(p). Each consumer will purchase a unit of the good every period





Consumers are assumed to only know the distribution of prices charged by each firm in the
market but not the individual prices charged by each firm. Consumers are also allowed in each
period to sequentially search and sample prices from firms they have not bought from in the previous
period at a cost c > 0.3
1We will give an overview of the MAB problem in later sections.
2Reinganum (1979) models the equilibrium of firms subject to productivity shocks (represented by marginal cost
being randomly distributed) and consumers with imperfect information.
3In contrast, a consumer can costlessly learn the current price of any seller she bought from in the last period.
This can be interpreted as the consumer starting every new time period at the store they bought from in the last
period. The idea is that consumers have all information about sellers they previously bought from but retains no
information about firms they merely visited, or bought from more than a period ago.
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The net period surplus of a consumer who has searched nt stores and buys at price pt is given










with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
We simplify the cost structure for firms so that marginal cost ω can take two distinct values
{ωL, ωH} where ωL ≤ ωH . We also assume that marginal cost of firms satisfy the Markov property,
that is,
βH = P(ωt = ωH | ωt−1 = ωH)
βL = P(ωt = ωL | ωt−1 = ωL).
For simplification β = βL = βH is assumed, so β is the persistence probability of a firm to
maintain its current productivity level. That is, in every given period, a firm’s state of being a
high or low cost is subject to change as dictated by β. This cost state is determined at the start of
every period will remain unchanged throughout the entire period.
Then assuming the system has a steady state, it can be shown that the number of low cost and
high cost firms will be equal regardless of the value of β.
Then given state of a firm, it can be shown that in equilibrium low cost firms will charge
pL = p
m
L and high cost firms will charge pH = min{pr, p
m
H}, where p
m is the profit maximizing
(monopoly) price4 pr is the (unknown) reservation price of consumers. It should be noted that
the reservation price pr is what dictates the consumers’ search rule i.e. if pj > pr then continue
searching, otherwise settle and purchase.
In a steady state equilibrium we assume that consumers will engage in optimal sequential search
to maximizes their discounted net surplus (1). Then a steady state equilibrium will be characterized
by a (joint) price distribution5 F (p1, p2, . . . , pM ) given M firms in the market that is unchanging
over time and satisfies,
1. Given F (p), the consumer’s search rule maximizes their discounted net surplus (1)
2. Given F (p), ωj, number of customers last period and consumers’ search rules, each firm
maximizes their discounted expected profits.
3. The firms’ profit maximization gives rise to the same F (p) given in 1. and 2.
As in Reinganum (1979), it can be shown that pL < pr. That is, it is not worth for consumers
to search until the lowest price pL is found if they have found a price sufficiently close to pL.





δτ−tD(pτ )(pτ − ωτ )
]
5Note that F here can be formulated as a binomial distribution, given that pj are all independent and can be
formulated as Bernoulli random variables.
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First we assume that at the steady state equilibrium, high cost firms are constrained and cannot
charge the monopoly price, i.e. pH = pr. Then writing out the expected surplus VL for a consumer
receiving low price pL at time t together with the fact that at steady state, there is an equal number






2VH + VL = S(pr) + δ
[
βVH + (1− β)VL
]
VL = S(pL) + δ
[
βVL + (1− β)VH
]
(2)
where VH is the expected discounted surplus from search continuation
6.
Solving the above system we will arrive at,
S(pr) = S(pL) + (4βδ − 2δ − 2)c. (3)
To understand this result, consider the two extreme cases, when β = 1 (or equivalently β = 0)
and β = 12 . Since all firms are ‘fixed’ (low price firms will indefinitely offer low prices), given that



















Recall that since there is an equal number of firms, the expected benefit of searching is 12
multiplied by (4). Hence, the consumer will set reservation price pr so as to equate the expected
benefit of searching with search cost c, given by (5). The intuition being that search is most valuable
when β = 1. Since all firms are fixed, the consumer can immediately pin down their discounted
lifetime benefit of all future expenditures when deciding between settling with their current price
and searching.
On the other hand, when β = 0, there is no persistence of the firm’s state across periods. The
intuition here is since firms now have equal probabilities of changing state, together with the fact
that the number of low and high cost firms are half-half at steady state, we can see that searching
has zero value as it only incurs a search cost c. Then for a consumer who has pr on hand, if he




which would occur with
probability 12 given equal number of high and low cost firms at steady state. Similarly, when we








where consumers will similarly choose pr to satisfy the indifference condition (6).
6pH = pr implies that consumers are indifferent between settling for pH and continuing their search.
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We can see that in the end, although cost distribution is invariant to persistence probability β,
the price distribution is.
2.2 Overview of The Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) Problem7
The multi-armed bandits (MAB) problem is a classic reinforcement learning problem introduced
by Thompson (1933). The problem exemplifies the trade-off dilemma between exploration and
exploitation (very much like our search theory models.) An armed-bandit is a nickname given to
casino slot machines where one can pull the arm to receive a random reward (essentially a lottery.)
The most basic framework of the MAB problem are the ‘stochastic bandits’. The problem
is formulated as such. There are K armed-bandits, each of which provides a random reward
rj ∈ [0, 1] distributed by F j which are i.i.d.8 for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Thus, the K armed-bandits
can be summarized by the vector of mean rewards (µ1, . . . , µK).
Define At as the set of actions
9 at time t which describes the interaction with a single bandit
at time t. So, if action at is taken at time t on bandit j, then the ‘action value’ of at is the mean
reward Q(at) = µ
j and her realized reward will be π(at) = r
j, where at is the action taken
10 and
π is the reward function. The agent’s objective is to maximize his total reward over T rounds. Of
course, in this model the agent is assumed to not know the reward distributions F 1, F 2, . . . , FK .
Thus the dilemma arises, where in every round the agent must choose between finding a different
arm to pull (exploration/search) and continuing to pull from the same bandit.
The standard measure of performance of a strategy/algorithm in the MAB problem or equiva-
lently, an alternate formulation of the objective in the MAB problem is to minimize what is called
‘regret’. Regret is measured using the best-arm as a benchmark to compare by. Let µ∗ = maxj µ
j ,
that is µ∗ is the highest mean reward (or the mean reward of the optimal arm).
Then define regret R at time t as,









is the action value of a.
Generally, there are three ways the agent can go about forming his strategy.
1. No exploration (trivial case)
2. Random exploration
3. Strategic exploration with preferences over uncertainty
There are several famous algorithms (ε-greedy algorithm, Upper Confidence Bounds (UCB)) the
agent can choose to implement which fall into one of the above three categories. Also, the problem
7Weng (2018), Slivkins (2019).
8Independently, identically distributed
9Where in our case we have A1 = A2 = . . .= AT .
10at can be interpreted as the arm chosen to be pulled at time t.
5
has been approached using dynamic programming methods11 which will be the main approach used
in this paper.
We can already see the many parallels between the MAB problem and the consumer search
model, with the main difference being that the agent has no information regarding the reward
distributions of each bandit. Another striking difference is that the repeated purchase model
(Fishman & Rob, 1995) as formulated in the MAB framework can be seen as a more ’forgiving’
version of the classical MAB, in that consumers can sample (at a search cost c) whereas in the the
MAB, consumer would choose a seller and immediately buy at the offered price.
3 Repeated Purchase and the MAB
First, we will formulate the repeated search model (Fishman & Rob, 1995) using Bernoulli ban-
dits.12 The consumers can be represented by a single agent, and the M firms by M Bernoulli
bandits (or M -armed Bernoulli bandits.)









1 if store is low cost at t
0 if store is high cost at t.
(8)




follows a (stationary) Markov process and we found that under a
steady-state we have that the probability of finding a high/low cost store is 12 .























That is, the reward function depends on the store chosen and its state at time t. In terms of












One other important item to mention is that given the reward function formulation in (9), we
are assuming that on the producer/firm side, they are behaving optimally and that prices reflect
their productivity state as was in Fishman & Rob (1995), in that low cost firms offer pL and high
cost firms offer pH with pL < pH .
















− c · n(t)
]
(10)
11See McCall & McCall (1987) and Gittins (1974).
12Bandits where the state space is {0, 1}.
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with discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1). In words, this means that in every period the consumer will want
to optimally choose the best store (arm) j(t) given the optimal number of stores searched n(t) in
each period t.
This formulation of the search problem as a MAB problem follows a very similar form to that
in McCall & McCall (1987) where they incorporate dynamic programming methods together with
Gittins’ index introduced in Gittins (1974), the decision rule being ‘always play the bandit with
the largest index’ in which we take a similar but different approach.13
One major difference between our context and other MAB formulations is that untouched
bandits do not ‘freeze’. That is, marginal cost of the store are still subject to change (via. Markov
process) regardless of whether or not that store has been visited. Figure 1 depicts a visualization
of the problem, where each black circle represents store j’s (unobserved) state at time t, an orange
circle represents a store who’s state is observed at t, Px,y is the transition probability and c is the
search cost. The blue arrows represent the Markov transitions of each store going forward in time
whilst the red arrow indicates search across stores in each period.14










Figure 1: State space diagram
3.1 Dynamic Programming Framework
To re-iterate the setup, there are M stores in the market, each of which are subject to changes








13Although we will not be assigning each store with a Gittins’ index, we will be assigning values on each store as
shown in the next section. The policy we derive is also an optimal stopping rule.
14A reminder that we are not considering a spatial model, so a consumer can travel to any single store starting
from any store at the search cost c.
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One important thing to note is that although the consumers are unaware of the price distribution
F (p) in each time period, we will maintain the assumption that they are aware of the transition
probabilities, i.e. the transition matrix P .15 This can be interpreted as consumers being aware of
external market factors influencing productivity shocks of stores.
Similar to Gittins (1974) and McCall & McCall (1987), to formulate the problem as a dynamic
program the consumer will assign a value to each store. To see how, consider the following illus-
tration.
First, at the initial period t = 0, let the consumer’s initial position be at one of the M stores;
that is she gets to explore the first store free of charge.16 Then before the start of each period, the
consumer predetermines the order in which she explores any additional stores.17 Since the price
distribution is unknown to her, the sequential order she chooses for exploration is inconsequential.
Now denote the order of the stores in which she plans to explore as {1, 2, . . . ,M−1}. Then starting


































































where the j subscript on Vj denotes the order in which that additional store was visited, i.e. the
jth additional store visited in the order of exploration {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}, xm(0) denotes the state







at t = 0.18
There are several important things to note regarding the formulation in (12). First is that this
formulation is valid for any period t. Next is that the initial dynamic optimization problem in (10)
required choices on both number of stores to explore n(t) and the store to purchase from j(t) in
each period t. By assigning values to each store as done in (12) we have broken down the problem
into a sequence of individual optimal stopping problems.
To see how, first notice that the formulation of the values in (12) takes in the stores observed
thus far and provides the maximum expected value for the current period and the subsequent,
15Note that consumers’ knowledge of the transition probabilities may lead them to deriving the stationary dis-
tribution of prices, if there is one to be found. This is however to do with an individual store and the probability
distribution of the state that particular store given a certain time t.
16This assumption smoothens the framework when formulating the Bellman equations.
17Any store explored after the initial store is considered ‘additional’.
18A short reminder that we assume the consumer is able to return to any store she has sampled at no cost but only
for that period.
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taking search costs into account.19 Then notice that at t = 0 (or any subsequent time period) the





the first store in the predetermined order of search {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1} to realize value V1. Then by
construction, if she accepts the value V1, there is no reverting back to the value V0 as the search
cost c is built into the value V1. Similarly, she can choose whether to discard V1 to realize V2 and so
on until VM−1. We now start to see that this formulation is precisely that of the famous secretary
problem (also known as the marriage problem) that was introduced in the early 1960’s by Martin
Gardner.20
3.2 The Optimal Stopping (Secretary) Problem21
We will first formulate the initial optimal stopping problem at t = 0 and derive its optimal policy.22
At the start of t = 0 the consumer is faced with the sequence of values {V0, V1, V2, . . . , VM−1} where
only V0 is known initially. Had the consumer been clairvoyant, she would be able to rank the stores
according to their values from greatest to least. Alas, her objective is to; given a predetermined
sequence of exploration {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}; find an optimal stopping policy that maximizes her
received value. The optimal stopping policy will take the following form: ‘Pass through a certain
number of stores, and after that pick the first store that yields the highest value so far.’
Before we proceed with the derivation, we will introduce some notation make some simplifi-
cations for convenience. For the purpose of deriving the optimal stopping policy, we focus our
attention only to the rank order of the stores’ values Vj, not to the actual values themselves. So,
the consumer maximizing her probability of finding the best store is equivalent to maximizing her
expected value received.23 Hence, for this section the term ‘value’ will also refer to the expected
probability of finding the best store.
• Let m be the number of stores visited/sampled. So the consumer starts with m = 1 which is
the store with value V0.
24
• Let n be the number of stores not yet visited, so M = m+ n.
• We say that a store is ‘viable’ if the store’s value is the highest seen so far.
• Define Ym to be the value when m stores have been visited and Vm has been discarded.
• Define Um to be the value when m stores have been visited and the m
th store is viable.
19Observe that the V0(s) term inside the expectation portion depicts that the value is derived from zero additional
searches as the consumer is assumed to appear in the store she purchased from last period.
20See Ferguson et al. (1989) for a history and review of the problem.
21We use the dynamic programming approach found in Beckmann (1990) to derive the optimal stopping policy.
22This can be applied to any arbitrary period t.
23Suppose after receiving a value Vj the consumer is convinced that there is a high chance that Vj is the highest
value. So we can see that maximizing the probability of finding the highest value is indeed the same as maximizing
her received value.
24If j is the index of search order, then m = j + 1. So after exploring M − 1th store, m = M .
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Consider the case when the mth is not chosen, then the value for the consumer is,
Ym = P
{

















Now consider the case that the mth store is viable. There is a decision either to choose or
discard Vm. Then if the m
th store is chosen then the value is P
{
mth is the best
}
= m/M .25 Since







Using backward induction, we initiate with the last store by setting m = M so we have YM = 0












































































































25In this case, m/M can be interpreted as the ‘search termination’ value.
26Discarding the final value offered by the last store results in 0 probability of finding the best value.
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3.3 Deriving the Optimal Stopping Policy27










< 1 implies that Um > Ym,
that is; the value of the mth store being viable is greater than the value received by skipping the
mth store.
Let m = m∗ be a critical cut-off point such that the optimal policy will choose the first viable

























The LHS of (21) is the value of rejecting the m∗− 1th store and the RHS is the probability that
m∗ − 1th is the best store. So, m = m∗ will be the first store where the value of rejecting m = m∗
is greater or equal to the probability that m = m∗ is the best store. Then it follows that Ym∗−1 is










It can also be shown that U0 = Y0 = U1 = Y1 = . . . = Um∗−1 = Ym∗−1 by noting the fact that




























That is, the optimal stopping policy’s probability of finding the best store is 1/e.29













28See appendix A to the derivation of (22).
29The 1/e solution is a well-known result which was demonstrated in Derman (1970) and others (see Ferguson et al.












where ⌊·⌋ is the floor function.








. To get a better understanding of the result (24)









Then notice that the optimal Y (m;M) value is decreasing in m as m
M
increases (say via M
decreasing.) Figure 2 shows a visualization of how the optimal m value changes as M increases.
From figure 2 we can see that as m
M
increases, the optimal cutoff m∗ decreases, hence the idea of
accepting the first viable value from store m∗ onward.
Table 1 shows the optimal stopping policy’s m∗ cut-off values and Y0 values for varying number
of stores M . We can see that the value Y0 tends to and fluctuates around 1/e for a high enough
number of stores M .
Finally we may conjecture that implementing this optimal stopping policy every period is indeed
an optimal strategy. Looking back at the value formulation in (12), we can choose to apply it to
any arbitrary time period t. By doing so, if the consumer were to find the optimal value in that
period denoted V ∗(t), that would mean that the current surplus gained from the store plus the
expected value next period less the search cost is the highest amongst all stores at t. Using ‘forward
induction’ reasoning we can see that by virtue of the dynamic program formulation, the desirability
of an action in the present is influenced by what may happen in the future. As a result, the optimal
policy that maximizes the probability of finding the store with the maximum value V ∗(t) for every







Figure 2: Visualization of Y (m;M) across M values
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Table 1: Optimal Stopping Policy Values30
M M/e m∗ m∗ − 1 Y0
1 0.368 0 0 1
2 0.736 0 0 0.500
3 1.104 1 0 0.500
4 1.472 1 0 0.458
5 1.839 1 0 0.417
6 2.207 2 1 0.381
7 2.575 2 1 0.350
8 2.943 2 1 0.324
9 3.311 3 2 0.382
10 3.679 3 2 0.366
11 4.047 4 3 0.390
12 4.415 4 3 0.380
13 4.782 4 3 0.370
14 5.150 5 4 0.385
15 5.518 5 4 0.378
16 5.886 5 4 0.371
17 6.254 6 5 0.382
18 6.622 6 5 0.377
19 6.990 6 5 0.372
20 7.358 7 6 0.379
50 18.390 18 17 0.373
100 36.790 36 35 0.371
300 110.400 110 109 0.369
4 Discussion
In this paper, we solely focused on the consumers’ optimal policy without considerations on the
effect they may have on the firm (store)-side. It is reasonable to expect that consumers’ behavior
will have an impact on the actions of firms, so the next question is; given that consumers use the
optimal policy we derived, will there be any changes in the firms’ price setting behavior, compared
to say the case in Fishman & Rob (1995)? In our analysis we maintained the assumption that
stores’ prices reflected their productivity state (high cost stores charge higher prices.) However, in
Reinganum (1979) and Fishman & Rob (1995) this was a result of firms behaving optimally given
that they were able to deduce the consumers’ reservation price pr. Since our search policy does not
use a reservation price, there is additional work to be done to see how firms’ will behave under the
search policy derived here.31
We have also taken quite a different approach to deriving the consumer’s optimal search rule.
30See appendix B for R code to obtain values.
31To this end, one may consider using the ‘adversarial bandit’ variant of the MAB introduced by Auer et al. (2002).
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Although upon closer inspection both the consumer’s search rule in Fishman & Rob (1995) and
our optimal stopping rule work similarly in some aspects.
In Fishman & Rob (1995), the consumer’s search rule is defined by a reservation price pr where
the rule is
‘If pj > pr, continue search, otherwise settle for pj.’ (28)
compared to our optimal stopping rule for a given M number of stores,
‘Pass through m∗ − 1 stores, after which pick the first store that yields the highest value so far.’
(29)
They are similar in that both policies are characterized by a cut-off; the reservation price pr
in Fishman & Rob (1995) and m∗ in ours. The basis of Fishman’s search rule is to induce an
indifference condition with the reservation price pr given a persistence probability β and search
cost c. We have seen that changes in β indeed influences the consumer’s choice, where consumers
choose lower reservation prices the more persistent the stores’ states are. This is also reflected in
the policy we derived. The consumer picking a certain store for its value Vj is also a result of the
the transition/persistence probabilities as the value takes the future expectation into account.




is indeed high. If this store is
likely to continue its current state into the future, this will be reflected in the value V as defined
in (12). Conversely, if the store’s state is highly volatile, this will also be reflected in V , affecting
its desirability to the consumer.
In the end, we can see that although the policies were formulated very differently, they do share
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A Value of the Optimal Stopping Policy

































































where the second line in (30) uses the fact mentioned above about m∗ being the first store to
satisfy the condition m∗/M ≤ m∗/M ·
∑M−1
k=m∗ 1/k.
B R Code for Deriving Policy Values
Visit the following url for the R code.
https://github.com/ctymarco/MABandSecretaries/blob/b1345a7d2c051129d98bcf82c0
81be1434756bc1/values.R
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